In April 2016 Manchester eScholar was replaced by the University of Manchester’s new Research Information Management System, Pure. In the autumn the University’s research outputs will be available to search and browse via a new Research Portal. Until then the University’s full publication record can be accessed via a temporary portal and the old eScholar content is available to search and browse via this archive.

A Minimal Account of Temporal Experience

Connor, Abigail

[Thesis]. Manchester, UK: The University of Manchester; 2019.

Access to files

Abstract

There are two features of temporal experience, perceptual presence and temporal extension, which I take to be essential. These features are both phenomenally grounded and intuitively plausible, yet they seem to be in conflict with one another. The truth of one seems to guarantee the falsity of the other. The first feature is that we only ever perceive that which occurs in the present. Perception is restricted to the now. However, in conflict with this, we perceive temporally extended events. We perceive events that unfold over an interval of time. If we only perceive events that occur now, then we cannot also perceive events that take time. This is the Puzzle of Temporal Experience. I develop the Minimal Account, according to which perceptual experience has a minimal temporal content. By appealing to a direct reference account of indexicals, I set out the conditions under which a perceptual experience of a temporally extended perceptually present event can be considered accurate. In doing so, I provide a solution to the Puzzle of Temporal Experience. The Minimal Account contributes to the current debate by analysing previously discussed puzzles of temporal experience. It helps to progress the debate by approaching these puzzles from a different perspective and providing a new solution.

Bibliographic metadata

Type of resource:
Content type:
Form of thesis:
Type of submission:
Degree type:
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree programme:
PhD Philosophy
Publication date:
Location:
Manchester, UK
Total pages:
324
Abstract:
There are two features of temporal experience, perceptual presence and temporal extension, which I take to be essential. These features are both phenomenally grounded and intuitively plausible, yet they seem to be in conflict with one another. The truth of one seems to guarantee the falsity of the other. The first feature is that we only ever perceive that which occurs in the present. Perception is restricted to the now. However, in conflict with this, we perceive temporally extended events. We perceive events that unfold over an interval of time. If we only perceive events that occur now, then we cannot also perceive events that take time. This is the Puzzle of Temporal Experience. I develop the Minimal Account, according to which perceptual experience has a minimal temporal content. By appealing to a direct reference account of indexicals, I set out the conditions under which a perceptual experience of a temporally extended perceptually present event can be considered accurate. In doing so, I provide a solution to the Puzzle of Temporal Experience. The Minimal Account contributes to the current debate by analysing previously discussed puzzles of temporal experience. It helps to progress the debate by approaching these puzzles from a different perspective and providing a new solution.
Thesis main supervisor(s):
Thesis co-supervisor(s):
Language:
en

Institutional metadata

University researcher(s):

Record metadata

Manchester eScholar ID:
uk-ac-man-scw:322662
Created by:
Connor, Abigail
Created:
29th November, 2019, 12:44:05
Last modified by:
Connor, Abigail
Last modified:
2nd March, 2020, 10:55:17

Can we help?

The library chat service will be available from 11am-3pm Monday to Friday (excluding Bank Holidays). You can also email your enquiry to us.