Paying for the wrong kind of performance? Financial incentives and behaviour changes in National Health Service dentistry 1992–2009

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Abstract

Tickle M, McDonald R, Franklin J, Aggarwal VR, Milsom K, Reeves D. Paying for the wrong kind of performance? Financial incentives and behaviour changes in NHS dentistry 1992-2009. Community Dent Oral Epidemiol 2011; 39: 465-473. © 2011 John Wiley & Sons A/S Abstract -  Background:  There is a tension between financial incentives and professional codes and norms, both of which are believed to influence the behaviour of health care professionals. This study examined the impact of changes to financial incentive structures on the behaviour of dentists working in the English National Health Service (NHS) as a result of a new national contract. Methods:  Comparison of six reference treatments delivered by all NHS dentists in England for the period 1992-2009. Results:  Large and abrupt changes in the provision of the reference treatments coincided with the introduction of changes in the incentive structure in 2006. Treatments which can be provided in the least amount of time (and therefore costs to dentists) such as extractions increased and treatments which are time consuming or have significant additional materials costs such as bridgework, crowns, root fillings and radiographs reduced substantially. Conclusions:  Changes to financial incentive structures can produce large and abrupt changes in professional behaviours. In the context of multiple and conflicting goals, greater thought needs to be given to policies to change incentive structures to mitigate their unintended consequences.

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