MA Economics / Course details
Year of entry: 2020
- View tabs
- View full page
Course unit details:
|Unit level||FHEQ level 7 – master's degree or fourth year of an integrated master's degree|
|Teaching period(s)||Semester 2|
|Available as a free choice unit?||Yes|
The aim of this course is to introduce students to modern economic theories on public expenditure, taxation and other issues related to the public sector’s role in a modern market economy.
At the end of this course students should be able to demonstrate a clear understanding of established concepts and theoretical results on collective choice, optimal income taxation, and the effects of income redistribution on the provision of public goods.
Roles of Government: Welfare theorems, social welfare functions, income redistribution.
- R. F. Inman, 1987, Markets, government and the ``new'' political economy, in HPE, vol. II, pp. 647-663.
- Myles, Chap. 2.
- A & S, Ch. 11.
- H. R. Varian, 1980, Redistributive taxation as social insurance, Journal of Public Economics 14, pp. 49-68.
- P. Diamond, 1977, A framework for social security analysis, Journal of Public Economics 8(3), pp. 275-298.
- L. Kotlikoff, 1987, Justifying public provision of social security, Journal of Public Analysis and Management 6 (4), pp. 674-689.
Private Provision of Public Goods: Effects of income distribution and taxation on provision.
- Myles, pp. 263-268, 279-283.
- T. Bergstrom, L. Blume & H. Varian 1986, On the private provision of public goods, Journal of Public Economics, 29, pp. 25-44.
- P. Warr 1983, The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income, Economics Letters 13, pp. 207-211.
- J. Andreoni 1989, Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence. Journal of Political Economy 97(6), pp.1447-58.
- J. Andreoni 1993, An experimental test of the public-good crowding out hypothesis. American Economic Review 83(5), pp. 1317-1327.
- J. E. Stiglitz, 1987, Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics, in HPE, vol. II, pp. 991-1006.
- J. E. Stiglitz, 1982, Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation, Journal of Public Economics 17, pp. 213-240.
- R. A. Musgrave, A Brief History of Fiscal Doctrine, in HPE vol. I. pp. 15-40.
- A. Sandmo, Asymmetric Information and Public Economics: The Mirrlees-Vickrey Nobel Prize, Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, pp. 165-180.
- J. A. Mirrlees, Information and Incentives: the Economics of Carrots and Sticks. Economic Journal 107, pp. 1311-1329.
- Myles, Chap. 5.
- A & S, Ch. 13.
Collective Choice: Plurality voting, Median voter Theorem & applications, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
- J. Levin and B. Nalebuff, 1995, An introduction to vote-counting schemes, Journal of economic Perspectives 9(1), pp. 3-11.
- R. F. Inman, Markets, government and the “new” political economy, in HPE, vol. II, pp. 682-685.
- A & S, Ch. 10.
- K. J. Arrow, 1987, Arrow's theorem, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, eds. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman. vol. 4, Macmillan.
- M. McGuire and M. Olson, 1996, The economics of autocracy and majority rule: the invisible hand and the use of force, Journal of Economic Literature, pp. 72-89.
Teaching and learning methods
- G. Myles, 1995, Public Economics, Cambridge University Press. [Myles]
- Auerbach and Feldstein (eds), 1987, Handbook of Public Economics, North-Holland. [HPE]
- A. Atkinson and J. Stiglitz, 2015 (1988), Lectures on Public Economics, McGraw Hill. [A & S]
|Scheduled activity hours|
|Independent study hours|
|W Chiu||Unit coordinator|
Lectures: Friday 9-11am,